Stabilization of capital accumulation games.

In this paper, the potential differential game concept introduced by Fonseca-Morales and Hernández-Lerma (2018) is used in analyzing stabilization problems for n-player noncooperative capital accumulation games (CAGs). By first identifying a CAG as a potential game, an associated optimal control problem (OCP) of the CAG is obtained, whose optimal solution is an open-loop Nash equilibrium for the CAG. Compared with a saddle-point stability condition obtained for undiscounted CAG in the literature, a sufficient and easily verifiable condition is obtained for both discounted and undiscounted CAGs. In addition, the concept allows the turnpike property obtained for OCPs in Trélat and Zuazua (2015) to be verified for CAGs. Lastly, an illustrative example is given to verify the latter stability result for some CAGs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]