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Lotteries, Possible Worlds, and Probability.

Authors :
Priest, Maura
Source :
Erkenntnis; Oct2022, Vol. 87 Issue 5, p2097-2118, 22p
Publication Year :
2022

Abstract

A necessary criterion of Duncan Pritchard's Anti-luck Virtue Epistemology is his safety condition. A believer cannot know p unless her belief is safe. Her belief is safe only if p could not have easily been false. But "easily" is not to be understood probabilistically. The chance that p is false might be extremely low and yet p remains unsafe. This is what happens, Pritchard argues, in lottery examples and explains why knowledge is not a function of the probabilistic strength of one's evidence. This paper argues that, contra Pritchard, modality holds no epistemic advantage over this type of "probabilistic evidentialism" that he criticizes. I begin with a review of Pritchard's argument supporting modality over probability; second, I explain the problems with this argument, and third, I offer an alternative explanation of the lottery example (which purportedly shows modality is superior to probability). At the completion of the paper, modality and probability are on equal epistemic footing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
01650106
Volume :
87
Issue :
5
Database :
Complementary Index
Journal :
Erkenntnis
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
159159891
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-020-00292-7