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Collision Forgery Attack on the AES-OTR Algorithm under Quantum Computing.
- Source :
- Symmetry (20738994); Jul2022, Vol. 14 Issue 7, pN.PAG-N.PAG, 16p
- Publication Year :
- 2022
-
Abstract
- In recent years, some general cryptographic technologies have been widely used in network platforms related to the national economy and people's livelihood, effectively curbing network security risks and maintaining the orderly operation and normal order of society. However, due to the fast development and considerable benefits of quantum computing, the classical cryptosystem faces serious security threats, so it is crucial to analyze and assess the anti-quantum computing ability of cryptographic algorithms under the quantum security model, to enhance or perfect the design defects of related algorithms. However, the current design and research of anti-quantum cryptography primarily focus on the cryptographic structure or working mode under the quantum security model, and there is a lack of quantum security analysis on instantiated cryptographic algorithms. This paper investigates the security of AES-OTR, one of the third-round algorithms in the CAESAR competition, under the Q2 model. The periodic functions of the associated data were constructed by forging the associated data according to the parallel and serial structure characteristics of the AES-OTR algorithm in processing the associated data, and the periodic functions of the associated data were constructed multiple times based on the Simon quantum algorithm. By using the collision pair, two collision forgery attacks on the AES-OTR algorithm can be successfully implemented, and the period s is obtained by solving with a probability close to 1. The attacks in this paper caused a significant threat to the security of the AES-OTR algorithm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 20738994
- Volume :
- 14
- Issue :
- 7
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- Symmetry (20738994)
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 158318571
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.3390/sym14071434