Special issue on algorithmic game theory (SAGT 2019).

I The Declining Price Anomaly Is Not Universal in Multi-Buyer Sequential Auctions (but almost is) i , by Vishnu V. Narayan, Enguerrand Prebet and Adrian Vetta, which studies the declining price anomaly, i.e., that the price weakly decreases when multiple copies of an item are sold sequentially over time, and shows that the anomaly is not guaranteed in full-information first-price or second-price sequential auctions with three or more buyers. The main results of the paper concern fractionally subadditive (XOS) bidders in sequential and simultaneous auctions under both the first and second price rule for each item. The Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) is a well-established annual event, aiming to bring together researchers from Computer Science, Economics and Mathematics, and to present original research at the intersection of Algorithms and Game Theory. [Extracted from the article]