China's Jinshan Yinshan sustainability evolutionary game equilibrium research under government and enterprises resource constraint dilemma.

This paper is based on analyzing the process of green innovation inspiration and green innovation compensation effect after the implementation of environmental regulations by the Chinese Government. This paper tests the hypothesis using the evolutionary game model and studies the underlying behavioral characteristics of the government, enterprises, and the relevant influencing factors. These influencing factors further aid in examining the evolution law applicable on both sides, which are aligned with the dynamic replication equation and evolutionary equilibrium states under different situations. The key variables used in this study include the concentration of government's environmental regulation, the cost of the regulations, economic penalties, enterprise's green innovation-related income, expenditures, and the enterprise's performance appraisal. Moreover, the results of this study reflect the system stability and equilibrium strategy on the proportion of retained earnings spent by enterprises on green innovation activities and the Government's strict environmental regulations. In the process of game strategy selection between the government and enterprises, the net income and weight of eco-efficiency indicators of the enterprises actively carrying out green innovation activities play a decisive role. Moreover, there should be reduced weight of economic benefits and increase the economic sanctions and innovation subsidies of enterprise pollution behaviors. Furthermore, reduced cost of regulations and innovation expenditures help guide enterprises to rationally allocate superior resources to enhance green enterprise innovation and take the level of innovation to the point that it achieves a win-win green sustainable development of economic performance and environmental performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]