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MULTI‐AGENT PERSUASION: LEVERAGING STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY.
- Source :
- International Economic Review; May2022, Vol. 63 Issue 2, p755-776, 22p, 2 Diagrams, 4 Charts
- Publication Year :
- 2022
-
Abstract
- A principal wishes to persuade multiple agents to take a particular action profile. Each agent cares about both a payoff‐relevant state and other agents' actions. The principal discloses information about the state to control the agents' behavior by using their strategic uncertainty. We show that for any nondegenerate prior, the principal can persuade the agents to take an action profile as a unique rationalizable outcome if that action profile satisfies a generalization of risk dominance. Moreover, this result remains true even if each of the agents is allowed to strategically choose whether to receive information from the principal or not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- PERSUASION (Psychology)
GENERALIZATION
SCHOOL principals
SOCIAL dominance
WISHES
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00206598
- Volume :
- 63
- Issue :
- 2
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- International Economic Review
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 156901300
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12546