How shareholder resources impact on the allocation of control power: example of China Vanke.

Purpose: This paper aims to explore the influence of founder shareholders' resources on the allocation of control rights from the perspective of incomplete contract theory and resource-based theory. Design/methodology/approach: This paper analyzes newspaper materials with NVivo11on a case of battle for corporate control in Chinese top-listed company-Vanke Group. Findings: The research shows that human capital is the key resource and the holding proportion of financial resources directly affects the allocation of control rights. At the same time, social capital is unstable and easily broken. At last, institutional environment also affects the degree between the relationship of founder shareholders' resources and the allocation of control rights. The influence of founder-shareholder resources on the allocation of control rights follows the path of "crisis – founder-shareholder's resources – founder's ability - allocation of control rights." Research limitations/implications: This study only selects the financial capital, human capital and social capital of Shi Wang, the founder of Vanke, as the analysis object. The study can expand the types of founder shareholder resources to verify and enrich the conclusions. Originality/value: The current theoretical research in the literature focuses on the necessity of equity and shareholder's resources versus the control rights. Some key factors and mechanism on the relationship have not been fully clarified. The results of this paper not only extend the combination research of social network and corporate governance, but also provide enterprise founders with references for making reasonable decisions during control battle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]