Akrasia and moral motivation.

The motivation problem as normally conceived is a problem about explaining the special connection between moral judgment and motivation. This understanding of the problem has structured a great deal of thinking in contemporary metaethics and moral psychology. For example, claims about the special motivational import of moral judgment have figured as central premises in the most influential arguments for noncognitivism. But debates about moral motivation have eventuated in seemingly intractable disputes between internalists and externalists about, for example, the possibility of genuine amoralism. In this paper, I motivate a new way forward, which draws underappreciated insights from philosophical thinking about the irrationality of akrasia. One central lesson is that discussions of the motivation problem should move away from the focus on moral judgment specifically. A more controversial and radical proposal is that the traditional motivation problem can be dissolved. Contra externalists, there is one fundamental and necessary connection between judgment and motivation. But this connection—a connection between all things considered normative judgment and motivation in rational agents—in fact requires no special explanation at all. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]