Syllogistic reasoning as a ground for the content of judgment: A line of thought from Kant through Hegel to Peirce.

In this paper I develop Paul Redding's suggestion that Peircean abduction and Hegel's discussion of the syllogism can be seen as a working out of Kant's treatment of the reflecting power of judgment, particularly concerning its role in conceptual change. After some historical background I regiment a use of singular terms, kind terms, and predicates across Hegel's three syllogistic figures and reconstruct an account of comprehension and extension for this system suggested by Peirce. In doing so I show that reasoning according to the ampliative syllogistic figures affects the content of these three classes of terms in precise ways. I close with a treatment of inference by analogy (associated by Hegel with the third syllogistic figure) as an exercise of reflection, and I discuss two cases in the history of science, one in astronomy and the other in biology, where a reflective exercise associated with analogical inference revised our understanding of the domain in question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]