Competing for seafaring labour: Social security and agency employment in Chinese shipping.

This paper discusses one strategy that Chinese crewing agencies adopt to compete with each other in the global seafarer labour supplying market. This strategy is related to Chinese seafarers' social insurance participation. It shows that crewing agencies utilised a dual workforce – 'company‐owned seafarers' and 'externally hired seafarers'. Externally hired seafarers, though in precarious employment, are offered higher salaries in place of social insurance coverage. By contrast, company‐owned seafarers are paid less, though enjoy social insurance arranged by agencies. This strategy serves to segment the seafarer labour market, conceal the level playing field and help agencies recruit seafarers cost‐effectively, though in violation of labour rights. This paper argues that this strategy grows out of the competitive landscape co‐shaped by the national regulatory and institutional settings and the global structure of the shipping industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]