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Rational preference in transformative experiences.
- Source :
- Synthese; Dec2021, Vol. 199 Issue 3/4, p6715-6732, 18p
- Publication Year :
- 2021
-
Abstract
- L. A. Paul's Transformative Experience makes the claim that many important life decisions are epistemically and personally transformative in a way that does not allow us to assign subjective values to their outcomes. As a result, we cannot use normative decision theory to make such decisions rationally, or when we modify it to do so, decision theory leads us to choose in a way that is in tension with our authenticity. This paper examines Paul's version of decision theory, and whether this version in fact admits of the challenge she wants to raise. I focus on her psychological realist view of utilities and beliefs and her notion of rational, authentic preferences as informed by imaginative acquaintance. I argue that Paul fails to engage critically with traditional accounts of decision theory and, on closer inspection, it is not clear that her version of decision theory entails a tension between rational and authentic choice. More importantly, I argue that if her contribution is instead to bring to light the importance of authenticity alongside rational decision-making, the definition she provides of authenticity in fact undermines her argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- DECISION theory
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00397857
- Volume :
- 199
- Issue :
- 3/4
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- Synthese
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 154096744
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03089-5