Continuous Group-Wise Double Auction for Prosumers in Distribution-Level Markets.

With the increasingly high penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs), more consumers with the capability of producing energy (hence called prosumers) appear in the electricity distribution network. Different from conventional consumers, prosumers are allowed to trade their energy with the power grid to generate income. To facilitate the active participation of prosumers in the distribution-level market, we develop a continuous group-wise double auction (CGDA) mechanism to coordinate the energy transactions among prosumers. In particular, the prosumers submit continuous double-sided bids to describe their cost-minimizing buying and selling strategies at different market prices. A distribution system operator (DSO), acting as the auctioneer, decides the clearing prices, the clearing power quantities, and the rewards for all prosumers. We prove that the proposed CGDA mechanism achieves several desirable economic properties, including truthfulness, individual rationality, weakly balanced budget, and asymptotic efficiency. We further demonstrate the superior performance of the proposed mechanism compared with other benchmarks through extensive simulations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]