The Principle-Agent Conflict Problem in a Continuous-Time Delegated Asset Management Model.

This paper considers the principle-agent conflict problem in a continuous-time delegated asset management model when the investor and the fund manager are all risk-averse with risk sensitivity coefficients γ f and γ m , respectively. Suppose that the investor entrusts his money to the fund manager. The return of the investment is determined by the manager's effort level and incentive strategy, but the benefit belongs to the investor. In order to encourage the manager to work hard, the investor will determine the manager's salary according to the terminal income. This is a stochastic differential game problem, and the distribution of income between the manager and the investor is a key point to be solved in the custody model. The uncertain form of the incentive strategy implies that the problem is different from the classical stochastic optimal control problem. In this paper, we first express the investor's incentive strategy in term of two auxiliary processes and turn this problem into a classical one. Then, we employ the dynamic programming principle to solve the problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]