Abduction − the context of discovery + underdetermination = inference to the best explanation.

The relationship between Peircean abduction and the modern notion of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) is a matter of dispute. Some philosophers, such as Harman (Philos Rev 74(1):88–95, 1965) and Lipton (Inference to the best explanation, Routledge, London, 1991, p. 58; 2004, p. 56), claim that abduction and IBE are virtually the same. Others, however, hold that they are quite different (Hintikka in Trans Charles S. Peirce Soc 34(3):503, 1998; Minnameier in Erkenntnis 60(1):75–105, 2004) and there is no link between them (Campos in Synthese 180(3):419–442, 2009). In this paper, I argue that neither of these views is correct. I show that abduction and IBE have important similarities as well as differences. Moreover, by bringing a historical perspective to the study of the relationship between abduction and IBE—a perspective that is lacking in the literature—I show that their differences can be well understood in terms of two historic developments in the history of philosophy of science: first, Reichenbach's distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification—and the consequent jettisoning of the context of discovery from philosophy of science—and second, underdetermination of theory by data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]