Variability in competitive decision-making speed and quality against exploiting and exploitative opponents.

A presumption in previous work has been that sub-optimality in competitive performance following loss is the result of a reduction in decision-making time (i.e., post-error speeding). The main goal of this paper is to test the relationship between decision-making speed and quality, with the hypothesis that slowing down decision-making should increase the likelihood of successful performance in cases where a model of opponent domination can be implemented. Across Experiments 1–3, the speed and quality of competitive decision-making was examined in a zero-sum game as a function of the nature of the opponent (unexploitable, exploiting, exploitable). Performance was also examined against the nature of a credit (or token) system used as a within-experimental manipulation (no credit, fixed credit, variable credit). To compliment reaction time variation as a function of outcome, both the fixed credit and variable credit conditions were designed to slow down decision-making, relative to a no credit condition where the game could be played in quick succession and without interruption. The data confirmed that (a) self-imposed reductions in processing time following losses (post-error speeding) were causal factors in determining poorer-quality behaviour, (b) the expression of lose-shift was less flexible than the expression of win-stay, and, (c) the use of a variable credit system may enhance the perceived control participants have against exploitable opponents. Future work should seek to disentangle temporal delay and response interruption as determinants of decision-making quality against numerous styles of opponency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]