Cite
Do Shareholders Assess Managers' Use of Accruals to Manage Earnings as a Negative Signal of Trustworthiness Even When Its Outcome Serves Shareholders' Interests?
MLA
Hewitt, Max, et al. “Do Shareholders Assess Managers’ Use of Accruals to Manage Earnings as a Negative Signal of Trustworthiness Even When Its Outcome Serves Shareholders’ Interests?” Contemporary Accounting Research, vol. 37, no. 4, Dec. 2020, pp. 2058–86. EBSCOhost, https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12592.
APA
Hewitt, M., Hodge, F. D., & Pratt, J. H. (2020). Do Shareholders Assess Managers’ Use of Accruals to Manage Earnings as a Negative Signal of Trustworthiness Even When Its Outcome Serves Shareholders’ Interests? Contemporary Accounting Research, 37(4), 2058–2086. https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12592
Chicago
Hewitt, Max, Frank D. Hodge, and Jamie H. Pratt. 2020. “Do Shareholders Assess Managers’ Use of Accruals to Manage Earnings as a Negative Signal of Trustworthiness Even When Its Outcome Serves Shareholders’ Interests?” Contemporary Accounting Research 37 (4): 2058–86. doi:10.1111/1911-3846.12592.