Regulation strategies of ride-hailing market in China: an evolutionary game theoretic perspective.

With the popularity of the sharing economy, ride-hailing services have greatly affected people's travel and become a new travel mode for urban residents. However, the lack of effective industry regulation has resulted in serious operational problems and growing difficulties in the furthering development of ride-hailing services in China. Therefore, it is necessary to study the regulation strategies of multiple subjects involved in ride-hailing industry. Based on evolutionary game theory, the paper establishes the tripartite evolution game model about regulation strategies of ride-hailing industry. The theoretical research and simulation results show that the evolutionarily stable strategy of a single subject (Transportation Network Company, driver or passenger) is affected by the strategies of other two subjects together. Moreover, when making the decision, the Transportation Network Companies (TNCs) need to consider the difference between benefits and costs, user scale, incentives and penalties from the government. Drivers need to consider their benefits and costs, travel user scale and penalties from the government and the TNCs. Besides, the benefits and costs, and the harmony of ride-hailing industry need to be considered for passengers. Potential policy implications are proposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]