A Multistage Sustainable Production–Inventory Model with Carbon Emission Reduction and Price-Dependent Demand under Stackelberg Game.

This paper investigated a multistage sustainable production–inventory model for deteriorating items (i.e., raw materials and finished goods) with price-dependent demand and collaborative carbon reduction technology investment under carbon tax regulation. The model was developed by first defining the total profit of the supply chain members under carbon tax regulation and, second, considering a manufacturer (leader)–retailer (follower) Stackelberg game. The optimal equilibrium solutions that maximize the manufacturer's and retailer's total profits were determined through the method analysis. An algorithm complemented the model to determine the optimal equilibrium solutions, which were then treated with sensitivity analyses for the major parameters. Based on the numerical analysis, (a) carbon tax policies help reduce carbon emissions for both the manufacturer and retailer; (b) most carbon emissions from supply chain operations negatively impact the total profits of both members; (c) the retailer may increase the optimal equilibrium selling price to respond to an increase in carbon emissions from supply chain operations or carbon tax; and (d) autonomous consumption positively affects both members' optimal equilibrium policies and total profits, whereas induced consumption does the opposite. These findings are very managerial and instructive for companies seeking profits and fulfilling environmental responsibility and governments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]