On causality as the fundamental concept of Gödel's philosophy.

This paper proposes a possible reconstruction and philosophical-logical clarification of Gödel's idea of causality as the philosophical fundamental concept. The results are based on Gödel's published and non-published texts (including Max Phil notebooks), and are established on the ground of interconnections of Gödel's dispersed remarks on causality, as well as on the ground of his general philosophical views. The paper is logically informal but is connected with already achieved results in the formalization of a causal account of Gödel's onto-theological theory. Gödel's main causal concepts are analysed (will, force, enjoyment, God, time and space, life, form, matter). Special attention is paid to a possible causal account of some of Gödel's logical concepts (assertion, privation, affirmation, negation, whole, part, general, particular, subject, predicate, necessary, possible, implication), as well as of logical antinomies. The problem of mechanical and non-mechanical procedures in the work with and on concepts is addressed in terms of Gödel's causal view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]