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Incentive systems in anti-bribery whistleblowing.

Authors :
Teichmann, Fabian Maximilian Johannes
Source :
Journal of Financial Crime; 2019, Vol. 26 Issue 2, p519-525, 7p
Publication Year :
2019

Abstract

Purpose: While existing literature focusses on the causes and negative consequences of corruption, this paper illustrates the potential use of whistleblowing incentives to combat bribery in multinational corporations. The purpose of the present study is to highlight that anti-bribery mechanisms, which have already been successfully applied in the public sector, may also be deployed in multinational organisations. Design/methodology/approach: A two-step qualitative research process was used. Informal interviews were conducted with 35 corrupt public officials, followed by formal interviews with 35 compliance experts and law enforcement officers. During the interviews, the advantages and disadvantages of whistleblowing incentives in multinational corporations were discussed. The interviewees' responses were subjected to content analysis. Findings: The principal finding was that rewarding employees with significant monetary bonuses may help to increase anti-bribery whistleblowing. However, such bonus payments should be made in only major cases of bribery to safeguard multinational corporations, company cultures and trust among employees. Research limitations/implications: The findings convey the perspectives of the 70 interviewees based in Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland. Practical implications: The paper offers suggestions to multinational corporations on how to effectively combat corruption and other forms of white-collar crime. Originality/value: While the empirical findings are based on a European sample, the results may be applied globally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
13590790
Volume :
26
Issue :
2
Database :
Complementary Index
Journal :
Journal of Financial Crime
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
137597000
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1108/JFC-04-2018-0041