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DOGMATISM, JUNK KNOWLEDGE AND CONDITIONALS.

Authors :
Sorensen, Roy A.
Source :
Philosophical Quarterly; Oct88, Vol. 38 Issue 153, p433-454, 22p
Publication Year :
1988

Abstract

The article discusses the nature of the paradox and the relevance of conditionals through an interpretation of philosopher Gilbert Harman's analysis of the dogmatism paradox. This interpretation tends to believe the existence of junk knowledge, from which one can not draw familiar inferences to expand his existing knowledge. Junk knowledge is a by-product of expansive knowledge that would cut down one's epistemic efficiency if it is thought and talked about. Conditionals can not always expand knowledge through modus ponens, but modus ponens does play a defining role for conditionals in that it is valid for all conditionals.

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
00318094
Volume :
38
Issue :
153
Database :
Complementary Index
Journal :
Philosophical Quarterly
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
13519725
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.2307/2219708