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Veto Players in Post-Conflict DDR Programs: Evidence From Nepal and the DRC.

Authors :
Ansorg, Nadine
Strasheim, Julia
Source :
Journal of Intervention & Statebuilding; Jan2019, Vol. 13 Issue 1, p112-130, 19p
Publication Year :
2019

Abstract

Under what conditions are Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs successfully implemented following intrastate conflict? Previous research is dominated by under-theorized case studies that lack the ability to detect the precise factors and mechanisms that lead to successful DDR. In this article, we draw on game theory and ask how the number of veto players, their policy distance, and their internal cohesion impact DDR implementation. Using empirical evidence from Nepal and the Democratic Republic of Congo, we show that the number of veto players, rather than their distance and cohesion, explains the (lack of) implementation of DDR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
17502977
Volume :
13
Issue :
1
Database :
Complementary Index
Journal :
Journal of Intervention & Statebuilding
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
134940015
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2018.1501981