Back to Search
Start Over
Veto Players in Post-Conflict DDR Programs: Evidence From Nepal and the DRC.
- Source :
- Journal of Intervention & Statebuilding; Jan2019, Vol. 13 Issue 1, p112-130, 19p
- Publication Year :
- 2019
-
Abstract
- Under what conditions are Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs successfully implemented following intrastate conflict? Previous research is dominated by under-theorized case studies that lack the ability to detect the precise factors and mechanisms that lead to successful DDR. In this article, we draw on game theory and ask how the number of veto players, their policy distance, and their internal cohesion impact DDR implementation. Using empirical evidence from Nepal and the Democratic Republic of Congo, we show that the number of veto players, rather than their distance and cohesion, explains the (lack of) implementation of DDR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 17502977
- Volume :
- 13
- Issue :
- 1
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- Journal of Intervention & Statebuilding
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 134940015
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2018.1501981