Back to Search
Start Over
Truth and assertion: rules versus aims.
- Source :
- Analysis; Oct2018, Vol. 78 Issue 4, p638-648, 11p
- Publication Year :
- 2018
-
Abstract
- There is a fundamental disagreement about which norm regulates assertion. Proponents of factive accounts argue that only true propositions are assertable, whereas proponents of non-factive accounts insist that at least some false propositions are. Puzzlingly, both views are supported by equally plausible (but apparently incompatible) linguistic data. This paper delineates an alternative solution: to understand truth as the aim of assertion, and pair this view with a non-factive rule. The resulting account is able to explain all the relevant linguistic data, and finds independent support from general considerations about the differences between rules and aims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- TRUTH
ASSERTIVENESS (Psychology)
ASSERTIONS (Logic)
GOAL (Psychology)
RULES
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00032638
- Volume :
- 78
- Issue :
- 4
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- Analysis
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 132368413
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/any008