Making local government work better: How local and internationally sponsored institutions interact to influence performance in Bosnia‐Herzegovina.

Why has international investment into reforming local governance in post‐conflict societies produced mixed results? Drawing on new institutionalism, the authors expect reform outcomes, even of comprehensive assistance, to be shaped by the interaction between new and old rules, an interaction mediated by local elites. This expectation is explored in three pairs of comparable municipalities in Bosnia‐Herzegovina. Using data collected through field research and an original index of local government performance, we find that most municipalities achieved incremental improvements in performance between 2005 and 2010. Differences can be explained by the varying endurance of old informal rules that antagonistically coexist with and undermine internationally proposed rules, as well as by the varying strength of local opponents of reform. The implication is that more effective promotion of local government performance requires more attention to and a long‐term approach to minimizing the constraints posed by informal rules and local actors opposed to reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]