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Seemings as sui generis.
- Source :
- Synthese; Jul2018, Vol. 195 Issue 7, p3079-3096, 18p
- Publication Year :
- 2018
-
Abstract
- The epistemic value of seemings is increasingly debated. Such debates are hindered, however, by a lack of consensus about the nature of seemings. There are four prominent conceptions in the literature, and the plausibility of principles such as phenomenal conservatism, which assign a prominent epistemic role to seemings, varies greatly from one conception to another. It is therefore crucial that we identify the correct conception of seemings. I argue that seemings are best understood as sui generis mental states with propositional content and a distinct phenomenal character. Rival conceptions are shown to succumb to numerous difficulties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00397857
- Volume :
- 195
- Issue :
- 7
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- Synthese
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 130300231
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1360-9