The role of state ownership on earnings quality: evidence across public and private European firms.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of state ownership on financial reporting quality regarding the characteristics of conservatism and earnings management.Design/methodology/approach Using a large sample of public and private European firms during the period 2003-2010, the authors test the hypotheses following Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) model for conservatism and the modified Jones (1991) model proposed by Dechow and Sloan (1995) for earnings management. To ensure that the results are robust, the authors conduct sensitivity analysis with regard to potential endogeneity and selection bias.Findings The authors find that state-owned firms are less conservative than non-state-owned firms, which is consistent with the idea that there is less need for accounting conservatism due to government protection. The authors also show that capital markets play an important role in shaping the relation between state ownership and earnings management. Among public firms, the authors find that state-owned firms have higher abnormal accruals and worse accruals quality than non-state-owned firms, which suggests that state-owned firms are not immune to capital market pressures.Research limitations/implications The study has two limitations. First, as state-owned and non-state-owned firms face quite different incentive structures, management behavior might be determined by factors that have yet to be identified. Second, prior research results suggest an inverted U-shape relation between ownership concentration and earnings management (Ding et al., 2007). It would be interesting to investigate the impact of different levels of state ownership on earnings quality.Practical implications As the paper investigates the role of state ownership on earnings quality using a sample of European firms, it brings new insights regarding the role of state ownership in accounting quality and firm performance. In addition, it considers the role of capital markets in the relation between the quality of financial reporting and ownership by considering a sample with both public and private firms.Originality/value The study contributes to the debate about state intervention in the corporate sector, by extending the knowledge of the effects of government ownership on earnings quality by using a large sample of European firms. Furthermore, the authors also introduce the effect of capital market forces on managers’ behavior in state-owned and non-state-owned companies by analyzing private and publicly listed firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]