Capacity of the EM Covert/Side-Channel Created by the Execution of Instructions in a Processor.

The goal of this paper is to answer how much information is “transmitted” by the execution of particular sequence of instructions in a processor. Introducing such a measure would provide quantitative guidance for designing programs and computer hardware that minimizes inadvertent (side channel) information leakage, and would also help detect parts of a program or hardware design that have unusually high leakage (i.e., were designed to function as covert channel “transmitters”). To answer this question, we propose a new method to estimate the maximum information leakage through EM signals generated by the execution of instructions in a processor. We start by deriving a mathematical relationship between electromagnetic side-channel energy of individual instructions and the measured pairwise side-channel signal power. Then, we use this measure to calculate the transition probabilities needed for estimating capacity. Finally, we propose a new method to estimate side/covert channel capacity created by the execution of instructions in a processor and illustrate our results in several computer systems. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]