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Is Ultimate Moral Responsibility Metaphysically Impossible? A Bergsonian Critique of Galen Strawson's Argument.
- Source :
- Philosophy; Oct2017, Vol. 92 Issue 4, p519-538, 20p
- Publication Year :
- 2017
-
Abstract
- What I want to do in this essay is examine a notorious argument put forward by Galen Strawson. He advocates what he describes as an a priori argument against the possibility of ultimate (moral) responsibility. There have been many attempts at answering Strawson, but whether they have been successful is debatable. I attempt to employ Henri Bergson's approach to the free will debate and assess whether what he says has any purchase in terms of criticism of Strawson's position. I conclude that Bergson's views offer a serious alternative in debates about free will. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]
- Subjects :
- RESPONSIBILITY
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00318191
- Volume :
- 92
- Issue :
- 4
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- Philosophy
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 125753632
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819117000079