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Experiences, Seemings, and Perceptual Justification.
- Source :
- Australasian Journal of Philosophy; Jun2017, Vol. 95 Issue 2, p226-241, 16p
- Publication Year :
- 2017
-
Abstract
- Several philosophers have distinguished between three distinct mental states that play a role in visual recognition: experiences, propositional seemings, and beliefs. I clarify and offer some reasons for drawing this three-fold distinction, and I consider its epistemological implications. Some philosophers have held that propositional seemings always conferprima faciejustification, regardless of a particular seeming's relation to experience. I add to criticisms of this view in the literature by arguing that it fails to solve a version of the ‘problem of the speckled hen’. A more promising view holds that propositional seemings confer justification only when appropriately related to experiences. I offer advice for developing such an account. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00048402
- Volume :
- 95
- Issue :
- 2
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 121926019
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2016.1202991