Problems of democratic governance of civil-military relations in Turkey and the European Union enlargement zone.

In the light of the pre-eminent role of the military in Turkish public affairs, this article seeks to assess critically the suitability of the entry criteria that Turkey must fulfil if it is to accede into the European fold. With that in mind, the article takes the idea of the ‘democratic control of the armed forces’ (Decaf), as conceived of by Western agencies such as NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) and the EU (European Union), and unravels its relevance and implications for the Turkish case. The key features of Central and Eastern European systems of civil-military relations, which are targeted by the Decaf measures are contrasted with the Turkish case in order to show that a single-model approach to Decaf is untenable. It is then argued that the way that the strategy that has been used for implementing Decaf is impoverished because it fails to capture the ‘real politics’ in which militaries are embedded. Based on that, the article reaches the conclusion that one of the central factors preventing Turkey's potential accession into the European fold is the prevailing civil-military relationship. However, the approach being employed by Western agencies fails to adequately recognize and respond to the nature of that relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]