Freedom, Responsibility, and Luck I: The Possibility of Moral Responsibility and Literal Arguments for the Proximal Determination Requirement.

MLA

Coffman, E. J. “Freedom, Responsibility, and Luck I: The Possibility of Moral Responsibility and Literal Arguments for the Proximal Determination Requirement.” Luck: Its Nature & Significance for Human Knowledge & Agency, Jan. 2015, pp. 97–128. EBSCOhost, https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137326102_5.

APA

Coffman, E. J. (2015). Freedom, Responsibility, and Luck I: The Possibility of Moral Responsibility and Literal Arguments for the Proximal Determination Requirement. Luck: Its Nature & Significance for Human Knowledge & Agency, 97–128. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137326102_5

Chicago

Coffman, E. J. 2015. “Freedom, Responsibility, and Luck I: The Possibility of Moral Responsibility and Literal Arguments for the Proximal Determination Requirement.” Luck: Its Nature & Significance for Human Knowledge & Agency, January, 97–128. doi:10.1057/9781137326102_5.