Truthful budget constrained auction for device-to-device relaying packet allocation.

Taking advantage of peer-to-peer transmission underlying cellular networks, device-to-device (D2D) communications offer various benefits such as coverage extension, traffic offloading, and improved energy efficiency. In this paper, we focus on a promising scenario where a D2D local area network is formed to relay packets for an out-of-coverage source device. A one-sided auction model is formulated from a unique perspective in which the source device decides the allocation of its packets among the helpers and charges reserve payments to the helpers according to their bids. The winning helpers only collect rewards from the source's deposit at the base station when the assigned packets are successfully relayed. In this model, we further take into account the budget constraints of the helpers to capture the helpers' resource limits and the risks that the helpers are willing to take. Based on this model, we propose three auction mechanisms targeting economic properties such as individual rationality, efficiency, and truthfulness. An enhanced Martello & Toth algorithm is first developed for the VCG-based auction to determine packet allocation that optimizes the source's quality of service. The probabilistic entrance auction mechanism uses sequential second price auction to achieve a low computational cost. The randomized mechanism involves a randomization over the above two mechanisms to satisfy certain requirement for social welfare while minimizing the computational time. We also conduct extensive simulations to examine the performance of the proposed mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]