Cooperation and Climate Change: Can Communication Facilitate the Provision of Public Goods in Heterogeneous Settings?

International and domestic efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions require a coordinated effort from heterogeneous actors. In this context, using a public good game with a climate change framing, the experiment reported here examines whether groups of heterogeneous individuals can meet a collective emission-reduction target through individual contributions. In terms of the framing, participants differ in terms of their marginal costs of abatement. The experiment consists of two games: a counterfactual baseline scenario examining the scope for voluntary cooperation and a communication game examining the role of stakeholder participation in facilitating cooperation. During the communication game, subjects are able to communicate with one another in order to coordinate contribution strategies. The results suggest that relying on the voluntary cooperation of individuals will not be sufficient to meet the mitigation target. Furthermore, while communication plays a role in promoting cooperation, even when heterogeneity is present, the non-binding nature of communication results in significant levels of free-riding. In particular, with the introduction of communication, two dominant contribution norms of free-riding and perfect-cooperation emerge. This outcome emphasizes the importance of sanctioning opportunities in ensuring compliance with mitigation obligations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]