Dennett's Strategy for Naturalizing Intentionality: an Innovative Play at Second Base.

I briefly review the three basic strategies for naturalizing intentionality discussed by Haugeland 4:383-427, 1990, and Hutto and Satne (), recounting their deficits. Then, I focus on Dennett's version of what Haugeland calls the 'second-base ... neo-behaviorist' strategy. After briefly explaining Dennett's proposal, I defend it against four common objections: circularity, relativity, under-specified rationality, and failure to track robustly natural facts. I conclude by recounting the advantages of Dennettian neo-behaviorism over the neo-Cartesian and neo-pragmatist alternatives, as well as Hutto and Satne's proposal that intentionality comes in two distinct kinds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]