Back to Search
Start Over
The value of communication in resource allocation decisions.
- Source :
- Contemporary Accounting Research; Spring1992, Vol. 8 Issue 2, p353-373, 21p
- Publication Year :
- 1992
-
Abstract
- This article examines the value of communication in a setting in which the owner and the manager of a firm differentially share the costs and benefits of information acquisition. Absent communication, the optimal contract induces allocative distortions to enhance the information content (about whether the manager expended effort in searching for additional information pertinent to the allocation decision) of the observed output. Communication has value because it reduces the value of the information externality in the observed output and, thus, reduces allocative distortions. Hence, the results lend support to the use of accounting reports (e.g., budgets) and ex post monitoring of decisions (e.g., an internal audit) in managerial performance evaluation. However, unless the manager's search is observable, it is optimal to use the information in the observed outcomes in compensating the manager. This finding highlights that the optimality of observed resource allocation practices cannot be evaluated independently of the larger problem of motivating the manager to acquire pertinent information because the information acquisition and resource allocation problems cannot be decomposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 08239150
- Volume :
- 8
- Issue :
- 2
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- Contemporary Accounting Research
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 10988363
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.1992.tb00849.x