Diplomatic Signaling among Multiple States.

Despite the difficulty of communicating with adversaries, scholars have described a variety of signaling mechanisms that relate to bilateral negotiations between states. This article demonstrates that when more than two states are involved, states have additional, costless means of communicating their intentions. In particular, statements of a third party to a dispute on behalf of a "protégé" are credible because of the effect these statements have on the protégé's conduct. Protégés that are emboldened by support will sometimes be more likely to take actions that risk conflict, causing the third party to be more likely to have to intervene. Thus, commitments to fight on behalf of other states can convey information to potential adversaries. This form of signaling requires that the interests of the third party and protégé be sufficiently aligned and that the third party be powerful enough, but also not too powerful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]