Evolutionary game analysis of multiple subjects in the management of major public health emergencies.

The frequent occurrence of major public health emergencies (MPHEs) significantly challenges national security, economic stability, social operation and the safety of people's lives and property worldwide. Consequently, enhancing the emergency management of MPHEs is critically urgent. This paper constructs a game model involving local government, social organisations, and the public for MPHE management, exploring strategy combinations and influencing factors across various scenarios. Several results were obtained. (1) Local government, social organisations, and the public each have positive and negative strategy choices based on cost-benefit analysis, leading to eight different strategy combinations. Furthermore, all three take positive strategies as the optimal way to achieve the game equilibrium. (2) The transformation of strategy combinations is primarily influenced by the cost-benefit gap and the strategic decisions of local government. (3) Altering a subject's initial strategy value doesn't change its final choice but impacts the time to achieve a stable strategy equilibrium. The severity of local government punishments on social organisations influences their strategic choices and the time to optimal strategy, whereas rewards to the public or social organisations only affect the time to achieve this strategy. The findings of this study can not only help improve the collaborative governance system of MPHEs but also provide scientific guidance on how governments can manage MPHEs.
Competing Interests: The authors declare the following financial interests/personal relationships which may be considered as potential competing interests:Rui Nan reports financial support was provided by National Social Science Fund of China. Rui Nan reports financial support was provided by Beijing Social Science Foundation.
(© 2024 The Authors.)