NORMS GOVERNING THE INTERSTATE USE OF FORCE: EXPLAINING THE STATUS QUO BIAS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

In this Article, the author argues against the standard view that there is no coherent and effective doctrine of intemational law regarding the interstate use of force. It is generally held that states interact with one another in a state of anarchy, at least when it comes to national security. After defining international law, I show that this is not completely accurate. Refiecting a status quo bias, classic invasions and territorial aggrandizement through force are illegal. Since 1945, states that have undertaken classic invasions have generally been sanctioned, and no state has taken territory from another by force since 1976. Part II presents a model that explains how norms not enforced by a centralized authority can have an impact on state behavior. I rely on political psychology and behavioral economics literature to show that the normative infiuence of law can cause states to refrain from attacking one another and the global community to sanction aggressors. The model as an explanatory tool is made even more plausible by investigations into earlier examples of the power of ideas to change state behavior and the finding that materialist or economic explanations of the status quo bias of international law are at best incomplete. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]