Uncertainty, Power Parity, and Conict Initiation.

The relationship between the distribution of power and conict initiation is one of the most studied topics in international relations. In studies of power parity and conict, there is an implicit assumption that all balanced dyads are created equal. However, there is variation in the aggregate capabilities in these particular dyads. This study addresses the question of what affects the likelihood of conict initiation within relatively balanced dyads. I argue that uncertainty - in particular the uncertainty of the expected costs of conflict - determines the likelihood of conflict among these dyads. More uncertainty means a greater likelihood of miscalculation that can lead to a bargaining failure. Hence, as an opponent's capabil- ities increase, uncertainty increases and the likelihood of conict increases. But, military action serves a purpose in bargaining and can help reduce uncertainty by signaling a state's willingness to inflict and endure costs in order to gain a better settlement. However, this information transmission is likely to be effective only when states have the capability to inflict significant costs. As such, while greater capabilities will lead to a high likelihood of initiation, they also lead to a reduced likelihood of reciprocation. The testing of contiguous directed dyads from 1885 to 2000 support the implications from this theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]