Los derechos colectivos y las acciones populares: elementos para la comprensión de un mercado.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the normative structure developed to protect collective rights (Act 472 of 1998) and the subsequent amendment (Act 1425 of 2010) by using the supply and demand model. This paper supposes, on the one hand, the homo economicus behavior and, on the other, the symmetric principle designed by BRENNAN & BUCHANAN (1987). The model developed showed a collective rights protection market, where the good to trade is the service to protect. This service is considered a public good, despite providing positive externalities and producing a preferences revelation problem and dynamic and static inefficiencies. The main results this paper found are 1) an excess demand as a consequence of the economic incentives designed in Articles 39 and 40 of Law 472 of 1998 and 2) an excess of supply created by the repeal of these articles in Law 1425 of 2010. In conclusion, in either situation, normative development disregards the effects and reactions of individuals, from the point of view of both supply and demand. This disregard implies a failure on the part of the collective rights protection market and its probable lack of protection. Given the above, it is necessary to consider strategies that lead to a normative design that includes both the justice principle claimed by Rawls and the not naivety principle developed by KORNHAUSER. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]