Cite
HOW HEALTH INSURANCE AFFECTS HEALTH CARE DEMAND-A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIORAL MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION.
MLA
Dong, Yingying. “How Health Insurance Affects Health Care Demand-A Structural Analysis of Behavioral Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection.” Economic Inquiry, vol. 51, no. 2, Apr. 2013, pp. 1324–44. EBSCOhost, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2012.00457.x.
APA
Dong, Y. (2013). How Health Insurance Affects Health Care Demand-A Structural Analysis of Behavioral Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection. Economic Inquiry, 51(2), 1324–1344. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2012.00457.x
Chicago
Dong, Yingying. 2013. “How Health Insurance Affects Health Care Demand-A Structural Analysis of Behavioral Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection.” Economic Inquiry 51 (2): 1324–44. doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2012.00457.x.