Paper title: Hail To The Chief? Presidential Approval and Supreme Court Decision-Making During War.

This paper seeks to understand the Supreme Court's wartime jurisprudence. Previous work in political science has found that the Supreme Court curtails rights and liberties during war to rally support for the president (e.g. Epstein et al 2005). This project refines this work by evaluating the Supreme Court's decision-making during war as a function of public support for the president. Generally, the Court behaves strategically, keeping an eye toward public opinion, to ensure that the elected branches will enforce the decisions of the Court and maintain the legitimacy of the Court (e.g. Barnum 1985; Page and Shapiro 1983; Marshall 1989; McGuire and Stimson 2004). During conflict, the Court's legitimacy as it relates to the president is of even more importance. When the president is popular, the Court will support the president to avoid a conflict with the president. However, when the president and the conflict are not popular with the public, the Court will be more likely to vote against the president and limit the authority of the president. This allows the Supreme Court to curry favor with the public by breaking with an unpopular president. I test this theory using decisions made by the Supreme Court from 1941 to 2006. This shows that during war, as popularity for the president declines, the probability that the Supreme Court votes to curtail rights and liberties declines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]