Interbranch Consequences of Polarization: An Examination of Court Curbing and Court Rewarding Legislation over Time.

During the past several decades, scholars have extensively studied the relationship between Congress and the Courts. Most of these studies have focused on separation of powers (SOP) models that attempt to display institutional responses to threats from one of the branches. These studies have been criticized for producing inconsistent results. However, recent scholarship involving only jurisdiction stripping or other court curbing legislation has been more promising. Although all of these studies examine the interbranch relationship between Congress and the Courts differently, they generally are consistent in how they model the distance between these institutions. In general, most studies believe that either the Court or Congress will rule or legislate negatively toward the other branch when the institutions are ideologically further apart. However, absent from these studies is any discussion on the possible role that partisanship and polarization may play in the process. This paper will therefore examine the possibility that as Congress becomes more polarized, more attempts will be made to curb the courts power. Additionally, studies have not examined the possibility and conditions under which Congress rewards the Court. This paper will therefore also examine whether court rewarding legislation is passed during times of less polarization. It is believed that through incorporating polarization and analyzing both court curbing and court rewarding legislation over time, a more complete analysis and explanation can possibly be provided regarding the interbranch relationship between Congress and the courts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]