Can Unilateral Leadership Promote International Environmental Cooperation?

Why do governments sometimes exercise unilateral leadership in international environmental cooperation, such as the mitigation of global climate change? It is usually the case that unilateral leadership cannot solve the problem at hand, so it is not clear what the benefits of unilateral leadership are. In this article, I provide a new political rationale for unilateral leadership. I show that if a green politician (worried about environmental destruction) fears that he or she will probably lose power soon, he or she may want to unilaterally implement domestic mitigation policies to reduce the domestic cost of mitigation in the future. By exercising unilateral leadership, this politician ensures that even a future brown politician (only mildly interested in environmental protection) is, due to the domestic cost reduction, willing to engage in international cooperation. The findings imply that while unilateral leadership is not a panacea, it may be a useful commitment device under empirically plausible conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]