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Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo.
- Source :
-
International Journal of Game Theory . 2010, Vol. 39 Issue 4, p617-643. 27p. - Publication Year :
- 2010
-
Abstract
- I analyze a stochastic bargaining game in which a renewable surplus is divided among n ≥ 5 committee members in each of an infinite number of periods, and the division implemented in one period becomes the status quo allocation of the surplus in the ensuing period. I establish existence of equilibrium exhibiting minimum winning coalitions, assuming sufficiently mild concavity of stage preferences. The analysis highlights the role of proposal power in committee deliberations and yields a fully strategic version of McKelvey's (J Econ Theory 12:472-482, 1976; Econometrica 47:1086-1112, 1979) dictatorial agenda setting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00207276
- Volume :
- 39
- Issue :
- 4
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- International Journal of Game Theory
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 53840782
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0202-5