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The W-defense.
- Source :
-
Philosophical Studies . Aug2010, Vol. 150 Issue 1, p61-77. 17p. - Publication Year :
- 2010
-
Abstract
- There has been a great deal of critical discussion of Harry Frankfurt’s argument against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), almost all of which has focused on whether the Frankfurt-style examples, which are designed to be counterexamples to PAP, can be given a coherent formulation. Recently, however, David Widerker has argued that even if Frankfurt-style examples can be given a coherent formulation, there is reason to believe that an agent in those examples could never be morally blameworthy for what she has done. Therefore, such examples do not undermine a version of PAP restricted to blameworthiness. Widerker refers to his argument for this claim as the W-defense. I examine the W-defense in some detail, along with three recent replies to it by defenders of Frankfurt’s argument. I contend that each of these replies is problematic and, indeed, that two of them play directly into the hands of those seeking to defend PAP. I then develop my own reply to the W-defense by calling into question an assumption which is at the heart of that argument regarding the nature of moral blame. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- *QUESTION (Logic)
*POSSIBILITY
*EXAMPLE
*PHILOSOPHY
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00318116
- Volume :
- 150
- Issue :
- 1
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Philosophical Studies
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 52110951
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9397-3