I GIUDIZI DI VALORE NELL 'INTERPRETAZIONE GIURIDICA.

This essay focuses on the judgment of values considered as an aspect of the relationship between law and morality. Hart's legal positivism has clearly underlined the issues raised by a formalistic account of this relationship, whereas the 'neo-constitutionalist' approach has the merit of accounting for the constitutionality of legal systems with respect to the relevance of this process for legal interpretation. On this basis, contemporary legal theory seeks to determine how and to what extent the judgments of value are relevant in allocation, and what consequences their preeminence has on legal interpretation. Legal hermeneutics, in particular, leads us to acknowledge that legal reasoning is embedded in the sphere of values but, at the same time, such an approach highlights, in terms of a sceptical perspective of interpretation, the inter-subjective criteria which limit judicial discretion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]