Budget Reform as Strategic Legislative Action: An Exploration.

By using the development of the appropriations process in the House between 1865 and 1921 to generate a series of cases, this paper explores one way in which two congressional research paths, rational choice theory, and historical analysis, can be joined. The theory section specifies four types of structural strategies that rational members of Congress might pursue in order to make particular substantive outcomes more likely expansionary fragmentation, retrenching centralization, expansionary centralization, and retrenching fragmentation. The empirical section of the paper examines episodes in the House between 1865 and 1921 when each of the four structural strategies was pursued Expansionary fragmentation is the most common strategy during this period, confirming conventional wisdom concerning congressional budgeting. But the exact opposite strategy--retrenching centralization--had its persistent supporters who were frequently successful at instituting reform. Finally, the other two strategies--expansionary centralization and retrenching fragmentation--were pursued less frequently during this period, but their pursuit still demonstrated a rational response to different decisional contexts. The general findings of the paper suggest that the marriage of rational choice and historical analysis in the study of Congress can be a fruitful one, with each mode of inquiry elucidating and extending the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]