Comment.

Statistical researcher M. Stone continues in his diligent search for flaws in the Bayesian theory of statistical inference. In the present paper he considers two examples in which Bayesian strong inconsistency can occur with a flat prior. Only a relatively few statisticians believe that a single theory of inference can be the answer for all of statistics. The committed Bayesian's, however, are prominent among such believers. There are, of course, substantial arguments against the Bayesian theory as a single theory of inference, a summary of these arguments may be may be found in D.A.S. Fraser. These arguments are not primarily concerned with the Bayesian method as a tool in the statistician's tool bag rather, they are concerned with the catholic claim for Bayesian theory and with the meaning and consequences of the theory in scientific contexts. The two examples considered by Stone are some what remote from Bayesian theory in a scientific context indeed, the theory will not rise or fall on the basis of the examples. Nevertheless the examples are extremely interesting they are concerned with implications of the theory, and they are presented with the attractive flair that we expect from Stone.