Reconstructive Presidents and the Supreme Court: Strategic Behavior in the Jefferson and Roosevelt Administrations.

Keith Whittington's recent work (2007) argues that, despite recurrent claims about the antidemocratic nature of the judiciary, the Court actually tends to reflect the ideological preferences of the other, democratically elected branches. Furthermore, Whittington claims that the Court plays a fundamental role in establishing a new political regime, a fact which is evident among the appointments of, borrowing Skowronek's terminology, reconstructive presidents. This paper will take this analysis one step further. While Whittington claims that the effects of regime change can be seen in the relationship between the president and the courts, the focus here will be more specific. The main question that will be addressed is, do presidents seem to consciously choose their appointees with the maintenance and expansion of the new regime in mind? To answer this question, a historical analysis will be undertaken of some of the appointments to the Supreme Court of reconstructive presidents. Specifically, the appointments of Thomas Jefferson and Franklin Delano Roosevelt will be considered in order to determine if these men had good reason to suppose that these judges would be faithful to the values and preferences of the new regime, thus demonstrating a conscious effort to remake the judiciary in the mold of their particular revolutions. By examining the pre-Court records of all eleven appointments, a pattern emerges whereby three types of nominee can be identified, here termed patronage, ideological or regional/political, all of which seem to play an important role in establishing the new political regime represented by each reconstructive president. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]